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Abstract 
That there was variation in the theories expounded by the major early thinkers on evolution is 
well established. What is less effectively articulated is how their intellectual ambitions and 
approaches to interpreting evidence reflect a deep-rooted difference in their views on what 
sort of systems, and problems evolution deals with; insights which speak directly to 
contemporary debates about how we communicate the nature of science with consequences 
for learning practice. We provide a re-reading of the perspectives adopted by those who 
formulated the central concepts of evolutionary theory to expose slender but persistent 
differences of emphasis. Our analysis contrasts the approaches to enquiry of three voyaging 
naturalists; Charles Darwin, Thomas Henry Huxley, and Alfred Russel Wallace. This potted 
history is used to illustrate the relationship between different traditions of scientific enquiry, 
specifically the natural philosophy approach characteristic of Wallace’s work and the later 
Neo-Darwinists; Huxley’s more empirical, natural history approach that anticipated 
punctuated equilibria, and Darwin’s emphasis on agency and choice, which suggests a more 
humanistic mind-set. These understandings are used to propose a model of the structure of 
evolutionary science which has broader value as a motif for exploring and communicating the 
transitions between different modes of enquiry. 
 
1. Introduction 
The social history of evolutionary theory has always been a fecund source of intellectual 
debate and disputation. At times contentious, controversial, and revisionist, writings on 
Darwin and his contemporaries offer ever higher resolution interpretations of how the central 
ideas of evolution were constructed, argued, and communicated. However, beyond the 
mundane detail of who said what, when, and why, these insights have a second, perhaps less 
obvious, but equally valuable significance in helping us understand the interplay between 
assumptions, observations, and theory. A mastery of how paradigm, epistemology and 
ontology shape both theory building and understanding is important for learners and 
researchers. It is only in fields where we have detailed chronological commentary on the 
development of thought, concepts, and models that sufficient evidence is available to enable 
robust formulation of these relationships. Evolution is one such field and the relationships 
between the ideas of three seafaring naturalists, Charles Darwin, Alfred Russel Wallace and 
Thomas Henry Huxley, is particularly enlightening. Although the contributions of all three 
have become rather obscured by scientific creation-myths, a re-evaluation of their attempts to 
reconcile their scientific, spiritual, and political convictions with both their own and each-
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others’ emerging understanding of evolutionary processes offers some stimulating insights 
into the structure of scientific enquiry. 
Darwin, Huxley and Wallace were scientific outsiders - seafaring naturalists catapulted to 
fame in the decades following the birth of nations uprisings of 1848 that marked the transition 
to post-revolutionary nationhood in Western Europe. All three of our subjects became 
celebrities and were elected Fellows of the Royal Society, but their influences on subsequent 
developments were very different. Our ambition is to both explain how their ideas differed 
(using a number of vignettes exploring how they viewed elements of evolutionary theory) and 
map the differences onto a broader, systems model of epistemological traditions which might 
cultivate improved understandings of knowledge paradigms. Interest in the subtleties of 
theory development surface periodically in mature societies which seek to appreciate and 
learn from the history of ideas. Our contribution offers an opportunity to rejuvenate several 
areas of debate around variable and not necessarily complementary ways of thinking about 
the relationship between the physical and conceptual in theory building (as lucidly articulated 
by Ruse, 2010 and Fagan, 2007) as well as the role of science in the development of 
worldviews in society (Matthews, 2009). Importantly it also offers education practitioners an 
abstract device for communicating and exploring the structural relationships between 
different ways of understanding the world; an emerging topic of some importance in 
contemporary science curricula (Kampourakis & McKomas, 2010). By drawing out subtle 
differences in worldviews and associated interpretations of the nature of science within an 
(ostensibly) single discipline we demonstrate some of the ‘heuristic power’ that results from a 
shift away from a homogeneous view of the nature of science towards an outlook informed by 
the specificities of a scientific field (Schizas et al., 2016). 
 
2. Darwin and plesionics 
The discipline of biology came into being at the end of the 18th century. Where natural history 
had focussed on descriptions and static form, the acknowledged pioneers of biology, Gottfried 
Treviranus (1776 -1837), and Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck (1744 – 1829), tried to integrate 
natural history with natural philosophy, the study of process and transformation.  Both men 
had been evolutionists in the sense that they believed species were mutable. Treviranus 
(1802) believed that species were super-organisms with a life-cycle of birth, reproduction and 
death. Lamarck (1802) had argued that evolution consisted of the co-adaptation of organisms 
to their physical neighbourhood. From the outset, the new discipline of biology had to 
integrate two sub-disciplines, morphology (the study of form) and physiology (the study of 
process). To speak of insect feeding-behaviour as physiology posed no problem because 
everyone knew what the insect was that did the feeding; but to speak of evolution as 
physiology begs questions about what actually does the evolving. It is easy to speak of the 
species as a sort of taxonomic super-organism, but the boundary judgements that delimit 
species are much less robust than those that define individual beetles. If biology were to 
become established as a unified science of life, the species problem would have to be 
resolved. 
Charles Darwin is the first of the three voyaging naturalists at the heart of our story. Although 
his grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, had believed species were mutable, the younger Darwin’s 
approach was broadly morphological and static. In his later work, however, Darwin realised 
that biology would need a species definition that could be applied without loss of generality 
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to people, plants and animals and would accommodate the mass of evidence demonstrating 
that biological systems could evolve. He was also a naturalist in two senses of the word: he 
was interested in living things and the patterns they created in space and time and was also 
committed to naturalism, the belief that scientists should never appeal to super-natural agency 
as a causal explanation. When Darwin wrote about the descent with modification of animals 
under domestication, he was writing about a natural process. This is a significant difference 
between Darwin and Lamarck. Lamarck, the natural philosopher, believed evolution was a 
process of adaptation to the physical environment. Darwin understood that, for Lamarck’s 
vision to be realised, biology had to be broad enough to cover the more complex processes 
involved in adjusting to a socially constructed landscape. Males became adapted to the 
choices and caprice of females and pollinators to plants, just as horses became adapted to the 
demands made of them by their jockeys. Artificial selection is natural.  
Darwin’s theory was closer to Lamarck’s than Treviranus’.  If evolution was the physiology 
of some super-organism, that super-organism was not a species, but a populated 
neighbourhood. The result was a plesionic model (from the Greek for ‘neighbour’ – plesion). 
Darwin argued that each corporeal organism was embedded in an open interval of space-time 
where it interacted with other organisms. We should emphasise that these terms are not 
Darwin’s. Darwin did not even have words to describe ecology, ethology (the study of 
behaviour) or co-evolution. In Origin, Darwin distinguished the mutual relations of organic 
beings – we would call it ‘taxonomy’ or ‘systematics’ - from the mutual interactions of 
organic beings, i.e. ecology and ethology. 
In Darwinian theory there are no less than three levels of organisation. First, there is the 
individual level. Each organism has a special (individual) and general (racial) memory and 
must struggle to exist. Second, there is the plesionic level, where a complex landscape of 
threat and opportunity creates a selective milieu where racial memories are winnowed. 
Finally, there is an emergent pattern that describes stable taxonomies of species and forms. 
There is no natural selection at the level of the individual. Natural selection is an aggregate 
phenomenon that can only be valorised within populations of individuals. Racial memories 
diverge to create species-like grades of organisation at a higher level of aggregation. The 
reason botanists, zoologists, ecologists and biogeographers cannot agree a universal definition 
of a species is that species boundaries are emergent structures shaped by complex accidents of 
history and geography on at least two space-time scales. 
Every Darwinian system operates on three levels. There is a micro-scale of events and 
ethology, a synergetic conjuncture of plesionic interaction that allows us to speak about 
selection and processes, and a macro-scale where the deep time perspective allows us to 
construct a locally stable, but globally dynamic typology. Darwinian systems can operate so 
far from equilibrium that they are potentially dynamic at all three levels. The ecodynamic 
interactions of populations create a network of threats and opportunities that shape and re-
shape processes at the plesionic level. These processes generate patterns in space and time 
that can be used to characterise species and their attributes.   
 
3. Wallace and Neo-Darwinism 
The Darwin-Wallace Papers were published by the Linnaean Society of London in 1858 and 
contained contributions from both naturalists on the process of variation and natural selection. 
One of the most striking features of Wallace’s contribution to the Darwin-Wallace papers is 
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his insistence that Lamarckian inheritance is a discredited theory. Unlike Darwin, Wallace 
believed that natural selection only affected racial memory. There was no inheritance of 
acquired characters. Both Wallace and Darwin were hard selectionists in the early days. 
Darwin’s understanding of natural selection softened through time while Wallace’s hardened. 
Among Wallace’s books on evolution were Darwinism (1889) and The World of Life (1910) 
Here, Wallace makes it clear that he considers natural selection and artificial selection to be 
different types of phenomenon. He also has very little faith in the role of sexual selection and 
none at all in Lamarckian inheritance. He marshalled evidence from August Weismann (1834 
– 1914) and Francis Galton, (1822 – 1911) among others, to support this view. Perhaps the 
most striking feature of the arguments presented in Darwinism is that Darwin himself would 
not qualify as a Darwinist. Like Darwin, Wallace assumes that organisms exist. Unlike 
Darwin, he also assumes that they can be organised into species-like populations using a 
combination of morphological and physiological attributes. In this way, Wallace effectively 
lays the foundations of population biology. Although he knew nothing about genetics, a 
Wallace species was a population of morphologically similar animals all potentially capable 
of exchanging racial memories by mating. Natural selection was a constraint that winnowed 
the population and forced animal populations into closer conformity with their natural 
environment. It was co-evolutionary in the sense that predators, competitors and food sources 
made a difference, but there is no emergence in Wallace’s model. There are populations of 
individuals that can be organised into species that are transformed by natural selection. 
Species are persistent things whose identity is conserved and modified through time.  
Wallace believed that human intelligence was qualitatively unlike that of animals. Human 
intelligence could only be explained in terms of some universal intelligence that seeded the 
world with agents, capable of evolving into higher forms. Speciation could be explained 
purely in terms of natural selection driving populations apart. Mate choice, agency and 
patterns of inter-species co-operation were not natural phenomena and so could not be 
incorporated into a scientific theory. This was a significant point of disagreement between 
Darwin and Wallace. Darwin felt he could explain the emergence of human intelligence and 
biogeographic ‘species’ by relaxing natural selection enough to create a two-level, fast / slow 
dynamic. Our higher cognitive function and moral scruples, for example, might actually place 
those who possess them at a small disadvantage compared to more selfish individuals. 
However: “…these faculties have been chiefly, or even exclusively gained for the benefit of 
the community; the individuals composing the community being at the same time indirectly 
benefitted.” (Darwin, 1871; 153). This model of cognitive evolution cannot be sustained in a 
world where natural selection is inexorable and any slip results in death and Darwin (1871; 
146) acknowledges that, “in the earlier editions of my 'Origin of Species' I perhaps attributed 
too much to the action of natural selection or the survival of the fittest.”  
There is a fine symmetry between Darwin’s ideas and Wallace’s. Darwin started off weakly 
religious and unconvinced by 18th century ideas about evolution. In one sense he was forced 
to become an evolutionist by the mass of evidence. His early work on the species problem led 
him to become a generalist, a hard selectionist and a Lamarckian. One cannot understand 
botany or ethology without considering the possibility that personal memories can be passed 
between generations. Darwin grew more agnostic as he grew older and his work on human 
cognition obliged him to soften his position on natural selection. Wallace’s early attitude 
seems to have been anthropocentric but more or less atheistic. He went off on his travels 
seeking evidence that would support evolutionary theory (Beccaloni and Smith, 2008) He was 
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not a generalist and did not really care about the species problem. Wallace’s intellectual 
development passed Darwin’s in the 1860s, but Wallace was travelling in the opposite 
direction. In old age he became increasingly convinced that human creativity implied the 
existence of a universal intelligence (Wallace 1910).  
Where the younger Wallace had been a naturalist in the sense that he did not build god into 
his model as the ultimate cause of everything, the older Wallace was a spiritualist who kept 
the natural and super-natural domains apart by building strong selective constraints into his 
theories. That hyper-selection eliminated adaptive potential, making it hard to explain the 
emergence of co-operative behaviour, agency and human cognition. Wallace’s solution was 
to invoke a god of the gaps, a god invented to explain all the emergent patterns that could not 
be explained by hard selection. Darwin, on the other hand, started off with a clockmaker god, 
who created the machine, seeded it with a few species and then exited stage left, leaving the 
universe to its own devices. He did not need Wallace’s god of the gaps because there was 
enough adaptive wriggle-room in the model to explain the evolution of flexible, adaptive 
behaviour and higher cognitive function. 
By the later 19th century there were two broad flavours of Darwinian theory. Wallace’s 
version was highly constrained, mechanistic and broadly predictable. It can be thought of as a 
‘natural philosophy’ model, comparable to contemporary developments in classical physics. 
This model, the fore-runner of what we now call ‘Neo-Darwinian’ theory, could be used ex 
post to explain evolutionary trajectories with the wisdom of hindsight and many biologists 
believed these insights could be generalised to the ex ante perspective. Causal processes were 
time-invariant. In Wallace’s understanding of natural science, every natural effect had an 
antecedent cause. The future was immanent in the past and hence predictable. Wallace 
understood that the single greatest challenge to this natural philosophy model was the 
evolution of agency and human cognition, which could not be explained in terms of 
constraints and time-invariant processes, so he invoked a god-agent to take up the slack. That 
which could not be predicted using natural philosophy methods had to be explained in terms 
of some universal intelligence. The Darwinian model, on the other hand, was agnostic and 
time-asymmetric. Darwin treated organisms as plesionic agents able to achieve a co-operative 
synergy that could change the evolutionary trajectory. Consequently, the past could be 
explained in terms of causal constraints, but the future was locally unpredictable. This 
distinction of time-symmetric natural philosophy and time-asymmetric humanism became 
manifest as a paradigmatic tension that effectively pushed biologists like Darwin (atheistic 
humanist) and Wallace (theistic natural philosopher) beyond the pale of mainstream science. 
 
4. The Darwin-Huxley Synthesis 
Like Darwin, Thomas Henry Huxley started his career as a voyaging naturalist sceptical about 
evolution. He was surgeon’s mate and ship’s naturalist aboard the Rattlesnake, a brilliant 
anatomist who saw the key to understanding vertebrate diversity in the morphological 
approach. He was interested in the idea that there was a basic taxonomy of animal ground-
plans, a little like the chemist’s periodic table or Goethe’s (1790) theory of plant archetypes 
(Urpflanze). Darwin introduced Huxley to evolutionary ideas and, although initially sceptical, 
he was won over. Huxley (1862, 1863) made substantial contributions to anthropology in 
both its morphological and physiological manifestations. Huxley believed that, if human 
cognition were to be studied as a natural phenomenon, rather than as a gift from god, one 
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could not afford to treat science as a source of gnosis, i.e. as dependable knowledge of things 
as they really are (Huxley 1884). Like Darwin, Huxley’s approach to consciousness was 
phenomenological, based on a Neo-Kantian belief that all human knowledge is derived from 
phenomena (from sense-data filtered, as it were, by our animal senses and shaped by social 
learning). Like Wallace, Huxley had reservations about Lamarckian inheritance (Huxley 
1878) and was also somewhat sceptical about Darwinian gradualism - natura non facit saltum 
(nature doesn’t make jumps).  
Darwin had used non facit saltum as an axiom that immunised his theory against empirical 
refutation. If species changed rapidly, the boundaries of species were potentially well-defined 
and Darwinian ideas seemed more speculative and equivocal.  Huxley, in contrast, was deeply 
committed to the ugly facts that slay beautiful theories (Huxley 1870). The geological record 
does indeed make jumps – Georges Cuvier (1769 – 1832) had speculated that the creator had 
swept all life away and re-created it afresh – but Huxley (1878) dismissed Cuvier’s 
interpretation and criticised him for knowing so little about embryology. Geologically 
speaking, he argued, nature does make jumps. The Darwinian model worked well within a 
geological epoch, but not so well between these step-changes. In addition to collecting 
evidence of step-changes over geological time, Huxley also described instances of small-scale 
jumps in the form of a polydactylous family and the so-called Ancona sheep. These mutations 
become manifest as discontinuous leaps between generations. They are not genetic mutations 
as 21st century geneticists would understand them, but chance combinations of rare genes, 
often emerging in small, interbred populations. Huxley called these morphological jumps 
‘saltations’.  
While Darwin, rather implausibly, used the imperfections of the fossil record to justify his 
assertion that nature did not really make jumps, Huxley accepted the gaps as a source of 
useful information about evolution. His ‘saltationism’ implied a stick-slip dynamic in which 
short periods of relative stability were punctuated, as it were, by catastrophic flips that swept 
species, families and classes away and replaced them with new forms. In February 1894 he 
wrote a letter to William Bateson containing the words: ‘I see you are inclined to advocate 
the possibility of considerable "saltus" on the part of Dame Nature in her variations. I always 
took the same view, much to Mr. Darwin's disgust, and we used often to debate it.’ 
Where Wallace’s Neo-Darwinism was never far from equilibrium and Darwin’s theory, 
though far from equilibrium, was constrained by non facit saltum, Huxley’s reworked model 
was locally catastrophic. The whole three-level system could collapse and be replaced by a 
new one so fast that no intermediate forms would be found in the fossil record. The species 
problem is much less troubling in a saltatory universe of discourse. There is no reason to 
doubt that different types of species would emerge in different circumstances, but no need to 
agonise about the species problem. Species are thereby morphologically robust categories.  
 
5. The debate on epigenesis 
As an example of how the slender and subtle disparities in knowledge-seeking agendas can 
generate contrasting explanations of identical phenomena we turn to the disputation between 
Huxley and Darwin about the nature of inheritance. When Huxley was invited to write an 
article on evolution for Britannica he began by linking evolution to epigenesis - from epi 
(above) and genos (origin). Later 18th century naturalists had tended to think in terms of 
organisms packed inside each other like Russian dolls. When Eve (or Adam) was created god 
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put the germs of her (or his) offspring inside. The germs of the germs of their grandchildren 
were inside those and so on. This theory, sometimes called emboîtement, implied that the 
possibility space of future evolution was well-bounded. The germs of all creation were 
present at the beginning of time. The only scope for contingency was in decisions about 
which of these germs would thrive and which would die without issue and, since god had that 
nailed down too, the principal difference between the human and the god’s eye view of nature 
was imperfect knowledge.  
Although this is clearly a religious way of looking at the world, it contains the germs of the 
classic approach to natural science. The universe of possibilities is closed. Although we who 
are trapped in space and time do not know what has happened and will happen, gnosis is 
theoretically attainable because reality is independent of human knowledge and belief. To 
believe that reality is bounded in this way does not imply that gnosis is actually attainable. 
Classic science is an unending quest for the holy grail of gnosis. The antithesis of classic 
science is the romantic approach. Romanticism is more humanistic because it holds that 
humans are co-creators of reality. Romantic science does not necessarily imply gnosticism 
either. A romantic extremist might be tempted to slip into solipsism, the belief that reality is a 
figment of the human imagination, but most romantics simply accept that humans and some 
other organisms are agents and agents can change the course of history. 
Epigenesis is the belief that the organism is not merely fabricated from some genetic 
blueprint, but is actually assembled from information and materials gathered from both 
parents and from the physical environment in which the organism develops. Darwin’s (1868) 
model of heritable change, called pangenesis, is an epigenetic theory of inheritance. It has the 
organism created from a blend of gemmules derived from father and mother. Epigenesis 
creates an open universe of possibilities in which the future of an evolutionary system is 
unbounded and a priori unknowable.  
An epigenetic system is a complex, self-organising or self-sustaining structure (Waddington 
1953; Bateson 1979; Maturana and Varela 1973) which is brought into being by a synergetic 
friction between an organism and its environment. A system can be epigenetic without 
necessarily being plesionic. In placental mammals, for example, the mother’s uterus provides 
a complex environment within which the baby develops. There is no plesionic (self / other) 
interaction, merely an epigenetic relationship between the two. If there were twins in the 
uterus, the system would be both epigenetic and plesionic. Clearly, any organism that 
develops in an epigenetic context is potentially capable of emergent behaviour, but the 
probability of emergence is greatly increased if the organism is interacting with neighbours 
that are themselves capable of acquiring new types of behaviour.  
Ludwig Von Bertalanffy gave us a useful word to describe some epigenetic systems, 
equifinality. A poppy seed, if it develops at all, will always develop into a poppy, not a 
cabbage or a caterpillar. If it is short of nutrients, it will grow into a stunted poppy, but it will 
still be a poppy. Poppy seeds are equifinal systems. Bertalanffy speculated that ecosystems 
and social systems were equifinal too and so they are - sometimes. Equifinal systems tend to 
be almost isolated from their neighbours. Like the developing foetus, they are enclosed in a 
womb, bathed in amniotic fluid and buffered by the homeostatic mechanisms that sustain the 
mother. Darwin’s Galapagos islands were also almost isolated. Flows of material and 
information between them were so weak that they were almost closed systems, creating 
themselves from an internal genetic blueprint - the founder population. Systemic openness 
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and free exchange of material or information between neighbours undermines the principle of 
equifinality.  
This is arguably the principal difference between Wallace’s ideas, which formed the 
foundations of Neo-Darwinian theory and the Darwin-Huxley or saltatory model. The former 
is genetic; the latter is not merely epigenetic, but plesionic. From the Darwin-Huxley 
perspective equifinality is an emergent phenomenon that must be explained. Interactions 
between the cells of the human body offer a useful example for this. These cells are 
constrained by chemical gradients and bounded into almost-closed systems called organs. 
These boundaries weaken patterns of plesionic interaction, replacing a strongly competitive 
dynamic with a more co-operative mode of operation. If that co-operative dynamic breaks 
down, the organism’s health is compromised. 
At the time of writing, the Neo-Darwinian and Darwin-Huxley models seem to be ranged in 
paradigmatic opposition. Time has not stood still, of course. Huxley would have been 
troubled by the work of ethologists and evolutionary psychologists in the 20th century. 
Wallace would have been astonished and no doubt delighted by the success of Mendelian 
genetics, though one suspects he might have been troubled by its simplistic treatment of bio-
geography and the removal of the abstract god-agent he believed was needed to explain 
unpredictable phenomena.  
 
6. Study domains, belief and agnosticism 
The three distinguished naturalists whose ideas we have been describing were each struggling 
to place anthropology, the natural history of our own species, onto a sound scientific footing. 
Each was tip-toeing around the problem of agency and human cognition, trying to form a 
stable bridge of theory and evidence between the humanities and natural philosophy. That 
bridge must be able to explain time-asymmetric phenomena, creativity, and innovation 
without appeal to holy writ or dogma. The same rules must apply to the poet, the orang-utan, 
the beetle, and the bacterium without loss of generality.  
Thomas Henry Huxley (1874) clearly believed that the empirical evidence took absolute 
priority over abstract ideas and logical consequences, which he dismissed as ‘scarecrows of 
fools and beacons of wise men” (Huxley, 1882, p247). But Huxley’s empirical imperative 
does not serve us well in this context because truth is an ideational ‘thing’ and so are beliefs. 
Humanists and theologians have long understood that there may be three types of thing - 
material things like goods, ideational things like risk and symbolic things like credit ratings. 
These types of thing interact in a complex way. If you see a polity’s credit-rating (symbol) 
you may revise your ideas about risk (ideational) and, in so doing, develop a new pattern of 
behaviour which, taken in concert with other people’s actions, costs lives and destroys 
ecosystems (material).  This triangular relationship between object, idea and symbol is the 
basis of all textual interpretation and is sometimes called the ‘hermeneutic triangle’. 
It is only possible to ignore these differences in the nature of things in study-domains where 
categories are robust. Isaac Newton, for example, developed a stable taxonomy of masses, 
bodies, forces and the rest. Once it was stable, he could take it for granted and work on the 
physiology of the solar system or a projectile. Natural historians cannot do that. Our 
conceptual taxonomies change; partly because our opinions change, and partly because new 
empirical evidence often renders them obsolete. The difference between natural history and 
natural philosophy has to do with the stability of named classes. Once you venture into the 
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realm of humanism and agency, classes become much less stable and the empirical evidence 
is much less significant than patterns of discourse and opinion.  
When humanists and natural philosophers are allowed to ignore the natural history 
perspective, they can easily get bogged down in paradigmatic squabbles. The natural 
philosopher thunders that ‘scientists’ deal with facts and non-scientists with delusions. The 
humanists reply that the only reason physicists win prizes is that god gave them all the easy 
problems to solve. From a naturalist’s perspective, the disease that wipes out a family is not 
an opinion or a delusion. It was a thing when people believed in miasma and remains a thing 
now we believe in infectious agents. We know it is a thing because it changes the morphology 
and physiology of living organisms in an interpretable way. A nation’s credit rating is a thing 
for the same reason. Perhaps it only exists by negotiation and common consent, but a 
developing country with a poor credit rating is an uncongenial place. If it were a delusion, 
people would not be dying as a result. 
 
7. Intellectual and operational knowledge 
There is no scholarly consensus about the shape of science. What we offer below is an 
attempt to construct a phenomenological map or image of the intellectual landscape that is 
science, drawing on examples from our three voyaging naturalists’ claims to knowledge and 
belief to locate them on this map. Each of those naturalists had a slightly different perspective 
on the problem of human cognition. Darwin’s approach to natural history was humanistic in 
the sense that he understood that we humans create and re-create the life-support systems that 
sustain us. Unlike Wallace, he believed this was a natural phenomenon; an extension of the 
adaptive potential of other animals. Wallace’s approach to ecology was that of the natural 
philosopher, treating the environment as a set of near-equilibrium ‘boundary constraints’ to 
which organisms became adapted by natural selection. Huxley was a brilliant morphologist 
and anatomist whose approach was primarily empirical. 
If one works with scientists long enough, one finds that different types of scientist are 
interested in different types of thing and these interests tend to become manifest as different 
types of judgement. Charles Darwin, for example, was fascinated by conceptual taxonomies, 
morphology and boundary judgements. He was not merely interested in species operationally; 
they fascinated him at an abstract, intellectual level. Origin, as we have observed, is about the 
emergence of species-like patterns. In contrast, Wallace saw species as scientific axioms and 
wanted to know how pre-existing species were transformed through time. This physiological 
approach to species was extended even further by later Neo-Darwinists, whose approach was 
broadly mathematical and predictive. Where Wallace considered the study of human 
cognition and purposeful action to be scientifically intractable, Darwin and Huxley did not. 
Huxley did not share Darwin’s interest in the species problem or human agency, but was 
deeply interested in cognition. He considered human values and purposes to be cognitive 
echoes - static left on the neural networks that gave us the impression of purposeful action. 
Humans were conscious automata. We were not machines, whose behaviour could be 
deduced from mathematical laws, but there was no Cartesian ghost in the human body and no 
such thing as free will. Later Neo-Huxleyan biologists melded Darwin’s ideas about species 
as emergent phenomena with Huxley’s ideas about automatism. Conwy Lloyd Morgan 
(1922), for example, believed value-judgements in particular and cognitive constructs in 
general were emergent phenomena. Like Huxley and Darwin, the evolutionary psychologists 
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believed evolutionary systems could not be predicted, ex ante, though evolutionary 
phenomena could be explained, ex post. Like the younger Wallace, Lloyd Morgan left room 
for a god-agent in his theories, but this was no god of the gaps that created the universe and 
seeded it with agents capable of acting creatively. Lloyd Morgan saw god as an emergent 
phenomenon - an unpredictable by-product of human and natural agency. Humans and god-
agents continually created and re-created each other, rather as humans and political 
institutions shaped and re-shaped each other through time. 
 
8. Mapping evolutionary science 
The description of plesionics introduced above suggests a spectrum of possible concerns for 
scientists operating in the domain of evolution stretching from a focus on self, subjectivity 
and experience to a focus on universe and timeless truth. These extremes may reasonably be 
thought of as romantic and classic respectively. Clearly our three evolutionists lived 
somewhere between these extremes. We can represent this spectrum by creating a grid that 
spans the range from classic to romantic science, divided into five cells (see Figure 1a). The 
centre cell we label natural history. To one side of natural history we put natural philosophy 
and, to the other, humanism. With reference to the plesionic system, humanists tend to be 
interested in the relationship between organisms, naturalists in the environment itself, and 
natural philosophers in the relationship between environment and what lies outside it. 
Wallace, Darwin and Huxley are distributed across the middle of the grid, with Morgan in the 
humanistic mainstream. Wallace occupies the interface between natural history and natural 
philosophy. Most Neo-Darwinists are mainstream natural philosophers. Natural philosophy 
tends to use analytic method and symbolic reasoning to make ex ante predictions. Humanism 
tends to use discursive methods, ex post. We can represent this by modifying our grid so that 
it contains three rows representing discursive, analytic and empirical methods, and shading 
the centre of gravity (Figure 1b). 
The shaded diagonal represents the sweet-spots in those disciplinary domains where 
operational, boundary and value judgments intersect and well-posed problems are located. 
Humanists tend to harmonise intellectual and operational truths by concentrating on self-other 
interaction and linking empirical and discursive methods ex post. Natural philosophers tend to 
achieve the same effect by focussing on the relationship between arena and universe and 
linking empirical to analytic method ex ante. Darwin, Huxley and Wallace all live in the 
middle of the diagonal stripe: Wallace to the left of centre; Huxley in the middle. Neo-
Darwinism and sociobiology belong to natural philosophy and, as such, live closer to the 
classic region. As we move from centre to right, we pass ethology, evolutionary psychology, 
critical scholarship and post-modern humanism. Political theory, pure mathematics, theology 
and metaphysics occupy the outer columns of the grid, often passing freely from one end of 
the grid to the other. Karl Marx, for example, treated intra-communal violence and dialectic 
as cultural universals and failed to distinguish his own political aspirations from the laws of 
nature (Marx, 1867). Sir Herbert Spencer treated inter-group warfare as a cultural universal 
and advocated a laissez-faire approach to sociology (Spencer, 1864). Theoretical physicists 
and philosophers often make the leap between ideas and universal truths and the 
transformation of scale required to do this is operationally significant.  
As we pass from humanism, to natural history to natural philosophy, our attention shifts from 
the subjective and local to the objective and regional and on to the abstract and universal. If 
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we extend that trend to right and left then on the right we have a sort of romantic extremism 
that considers things to be figments of the imagination; on the left a classic extremism that 
considers things to be pale shadows of some universal reality. Note that the boundaries 
between regions are dotted to show that they are fully permeable and indefinite. To strengthen 
the impression that there are no barriers to free movement on this grid, we will roll it and glue 
the edges together and then roll the ends of the tube round to create a torus (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: (a) The spectrum of science: from classic (right) to romantic (left), (b) a 
generalisation of the spectrum showing intellectual comfort zones for various scientific 





The torus is broadly agnostic near the bottom and gnostic near the top. Romantic and classic 
gnosticism butt up against each other here. It is possible to move across the dotted line at the 
top of the torus, but one is likely to experience an uncomfortable singularity or discontinuity 
between the study of the universal and the personal. This is where the dogmatic universalist 
meets the puritan; the romantic solipsist contends with the classic hyper-reductionist, and the 
political theorist gets confused about the distinction of value judgements from universal 
scientific laws. This model space is so constructed that no research project, community or 
individual can be represented as a unique point. We are represented by broad, sometimes 
discontinuous smears. Imagine Huxley, somewhere near the natural philosophy side of 
natural history, sincerely advocating an agnostic approach to science and being tempted by 
his own reforming zeal and the ethical issues to flip up to the top of the torus, stand on his 
soapbox and preach the universal importance of agnosticism. 
The hermeneutic triangle is also evident within the toruss structure. Near the bottom of the 
torus the work is highly empirical. The distinction of object from idea from name is relatively 
clear. As you move up the right hand side into humanism, your scale of observation changes. 
You become more aware of physiology, the effect of purposeful action and accidents of 
history. Purposeful agency and teleology are significant here and physiology must deal with a 
narrative chain of events and rich description. The hermeneutic triangle flattens down to the 
point where material things fade into the background and the foreground is dominated by the 
relationship between symbols (words) and ideas. If you move clockwise up into natural 
philosophy, your scale of observation increases. Processes become time-symmetric and a 
machine-like, efficient (machine-like) cause comes into view. The work becomes more 
analytic and the hermeneutic triangle flattens once again, focussing attention on the 
relationship between symbols (particularly mathematical symbols) and ideas and pushing 
material evidence into the background.  
The closer one gets to the top of the torus, the harder it is to distinguish morphology from 
physiology because the human experience of space and time is scarcely visible at all and we 
find ourselves arguing about universal truths. Universal truths are neither dynamic nor static; 
they are just true. There are only symbols and ideas up here in the gnostic domain. That 
terrible singularity where our ideas about the very large and the very small come into contact 
is an artefact of space-time perspective. We humans evolved in physical arenas. Our cognitive 
intuitions have been honed into conformity with the middle-range experience of everyday 
life. The closer we get to the top of the torus, the weaker the relationship between ideas and 
material evidence. The singularity at the top could be a political artefact, but it is also possible 
that it represents a conflict between two sets of cognitive intuitions, one of which deals with 
flat hermeneutic triangles linguistically, while the other tackles them from an analytic 
standpoint.  
 
9. The evolution of ideas and science education  
The model we have sketched here, though heavily simplified, fits the patterns one finds in the 
seminal literature of the 19th century and can be extended into the 20th century without much 
difficulty. The foregoing analysis provides a general summary of the key ideas needed to 
begin thinking about thinking. With a conceptual taxonomy that includes the elements of 
plesionics (environment, self, others and universe) we can begin to situate scientific 
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endeavour in a human framework. Using these tools, we have been able to move from a 
picture of human interaction to a general model of science and we have begun to develop the 
latter to summarise problem spaces and the scale and emphasis of different scientific fields. 
The writings of three intellectual giants have helped us flesh out the similarities and 
differences between humanism, natural history and natural philosophy so as to provide a 
general model capable of supporting learning about the structure of and relationships between 
these scientific traditions. 
Asking questions about what sort of pursuit science is, what its role in society is, and what 
assumptions about the role of knowledge and understanding imprint themselves on scientific 
practice is an important habit for both scientists and citizens. Understanding science as 
process is a frequent pedagogic terminus in this regard and the debates, controversies and 
paradignatic struggles which infuse the history of evolutionary science with both passion and 
intellectual challenge have provided rich pickings for scholars wishing to illustrate how 
science works. The musings of all three of our protagonists in particular deliver numerous 
opportunities for such learning (see Lyons 2010 for a well-articulated example). However, 
revealing the mutual influences between evidence and theory is only part of the challenge. 
Learners need to be taken beyond, into the non-trivial realm of why and how science serves 
humanity so that we can appreciate how different claims for the credibility and value of 
scientific endeavour are formulated and justified. Previous contributions to this broader 
canvass of the role which intellectual traditions play in shaping theory development and 
understanding have often failed to identify the educational prospects emergent from such 
insights. Sporadic contributions which have dallied with the pedagogic implications of how 
scientific endeavour is viewed by scientists (notable examples of which have come from 
Moran, 2006 and Maxwell, 2012)  have recently been enriched by clear calls for educators to 
better incorporate understandings of the nature of science and epistemology in their curricula 
(Sandoval, 2014). 
Even a cursory appreciation of how claims to knowledge and understanding are fashioned and 
defended by (often implicit) reference to wider frames of social and cultural reference 
provides an important starting point for learning about scientific method and the relationships 
between science and society and between scientific disciplines. Whilst the fact that the 
world’s problems do not come in disciplinary shaped boxes is now widely recognised, the 
learning of skills and competencies to underpin interdisciplinary investigation is dependent on 
a deep appreciation of the natures and roles of science (Fortuin et al., 2011). Awareness of, 
and the ability to interpret and manipulate, the central tenets of theories and allied methods is 
a critical tool in the search for accommodation between different perspectives or approaches. 
An understanding of the nature of problems, how we might acquire knowledge about the 
world, the strengths and weaknesses of different forms of enquiry, and the knitting together of 
knowledge to support action are central to the emergence of well-rounded professionals 
(Puolimatka, 2008). The arguably as yet incomplete Mode 2 revolution in knowledge 
generation (Gibbons et al., 1994) is dependent on a new generation of scientists and 
practitioners who comprehend how variation in cognition, context, and preconception fuel 
disagreement and can explain how and why shades of meaning and interpretation emerge. 
The value of interdisciplinary endeavour is achieved not only through being able to bring 
methods from disciplines a and b to bear on the same problem but, perhaps more importantly, 
through understanding the epistemic and ontological tenets and assumptions which underpin 
the practice of and claims to legitimacy for those disciplines. 
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The story of how Darwin, Huxley, and Wallace patterned their own ideas, skirmished with 
those of their adversaries, and struggled to harmonise their emerging theories with the 
paradigms which gave birth to them encourages us to think about the roles of assumption, 
uncertainty, and accommodation in scientific endeavour. It also tells us a lot about the need 
for improved communication across the boundaries which demarcate scientific paradigms and 
practice. Hence, such chronicles not only inform about the historical development of ideas but 
also exemplify scientific culture, helping to nurture enquiring, challenging minds. Although 
tools, techniques and storylines that can be used to elucidate the influence of intellectual 
traditions on theory development remain few and far between, the rather unconventional 
narrative and model offered in this contribution demonstrates that such aids can be compiled 
from relatively simple starting points. 
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